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I. Introduction
1. Collective enforcement of consumer rights
in the Netherlands
Dutch consumers have at their disposal a whole ârsenal of consumer
rights, most of them being of European origin. The problem lies in
the enforcement of those rights. Individual enforcement alone does not
suffice insofar as the costs of proceedings are often higher than the
amount at stake. This deters the consumer from invoking his rights.
What is more, most consumers are unaware of their rights, despite the
many information duties; national courts are therefore obliged to apply
European consumer law of their own motion (er offici,o).L
But European and national legislation also provide for collective
enforcement and redress mechanisms. In the Netherlands, these me-
chanisms are implemented in both administrative and civil law. This
paper outlines the Dutch mix of collective enforcement mechanisms that
applies to consumer issues. It also expiores the shortcomings of the exis-
ting mechanisms and assesses to what extent recent legal amendments
have remedied those drawbacks and insufficiencies. Finally it sheds so-
me light on the future of collective enforcement in the Netherlands and
more specifically on the proposed change of law regarding collective
compensatory redress (July 2014).
2. PIL and other forms of group litigation
What struck me when I went on to examine the concept of public
interest litigation (PIL) a little closer is that the literature on this topic
holds diverging definitions of public interest law. There is consensus on
the fact that PIL purports to protect the vulnerable segments ofsociety,
including consumers, to change policies and practices, and to encourage
regulation by using lav¡. There is PIL directed at public authorities and
PIL directed at wrongdoers. This, however, is a very broad definition
that at first sight encompasses different types of group litigation.
These forms of group litigation differ as regards:
- the size of the group on behalf of which the action is brought (a
speciflc group, a more general group or the public at large) and
the identifrability of the group members;
lCase C-168/05, Mostaza Claro, [2006] ECR I-10421.
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mass damages settlement agreement, section III_
- the obligation to opt-in or to opt-out (the restriction ofthe action
to the members of the group);
- to possibility to claim (punitive) damages;
- the initiator of the action (an individual claimant or a group of
claimants, a public or private body representing consumer inte_
rests on a structural or ad hoc basis, an attorney).
According to the stady on the cond,it'ions of crai,ms for d,amages ,in
case of infri,ngement of EC compet'iti,on rules, prL is more speciãcaily
'li;t'igation, usually bg a representatiue organi,sation, that ,is not d,one
on behalf of any identified i,nd,i,ui.d,uals but for the benef,t of the publi,c
at large. Any damages awarded, ,in the contert of such ctai,ms àre ¿n
sorne uaa g'iuen to the general publi,c. Thi,s d,i,ffers from class actions
and collecti,ue cla'ims i,n that the proceed,,ings are brought on behøtf of
the publi'c at large rather than a group of i,ndduiduals (ei.ther i,dentif,ed,
or un'id,entifi,ed,)'.2 The Wtti,te paper Matci,ng antitrust d,amages actions
more effecti'ue i,n the Eu: werfare'impact ønd, potential sceiari,os addsthat 
"if (...) o group cons,ists of the publi,c at large, the alternatiue
resembles a public i,nterest li,ti,gati,on and wi,u typi,catty be a mandatory
representati,ue act'ion, under wh,ich u,icti,ms will not haue the possibiti,ty
to opt-out'.3
PIL thus appears to be the broadest type of group litigation as
opposed to class, representative or joint actions. It regàrds ãollective
actions in which the individuals whose interests are involved cannot be
identified because ofthe generarity ofthe interest. pIL goes beyond theindividual interests instead of bundring them.a other-forms tf g.o,rplitigation allow for some form of identification or demarcation.
In the Netherlands, collective d,arnages actions do not exist. Even
though such actions might see the tight of day soon (section vI), group
Iitigation remains currentry confined to pubric enforàement 1."áiiã" nJand to private injunctive and declaratory conective redress (in combi-
nation with the possibility to aggregate damages craims or to reach a
Publi,c 'ínterest li.t'igat'ion in the Netherland,s 89
A striking observation made by the aforementioned study is that'the
Ieuel of di,uersi,ty 'in the area of group li,ti,gati,on rneans that any attempt
at categorisat'ion looks uery much. li,ke shoe-horn'ing ønd ,is moreouer
often 'inadequate due to the non-equi,ualence of terms in the di,fferent
Commun'ity languages'.5 As a result, I witl avoid using 'labels' without
mentioning the characteristics of each coliective enforcement mecha-
nism. For the sake of clarity, I will use the above mentioned criteria
and specify which boxes are ticked.
II. Public enforcement of consumer rights
in the Netherlands
i. From Consumer Authority to Authority for Consumer
and Markets6
Pubiic enforcement of consumer rights was introduced by the Dutch
government ín 2007 with the enactment of the Act on Enforcement
of Consumer Protection (Wet handhau'ing consumentenbescherrni,ng)
and the establishment of the Consumer Authority (CA). The govern-
ment acknowledged that many traders did not only fail to comply with
consumer legislation, but deliberately intended to deprive consumers
of their (mandatory) rights.T Consumers proved incapable of tackling
this behavior by exercising private remedies. What is more, Reguiation
200612004 required the Member States to set up an instrument in or-
der to deal with cross-border infringement on consumer legislation. The
Dutch government however considered that consumers should enjoy the
same level of protection against purely domestic infringements.
In the meanwhile, the CA has merged with the Competition Autho-
rity and the Netherlands Independent Post and Telecommunication Au-
thority (OPTA) into the Authority for Consumer and Markets (ACM)
Shttp: //ec . europa. eu/conpetitíon/antitrust/act ionsdamages/conparative
report clean en.pdf. p. 43.6This section is substantially based on a speech delivered by Anita Ve.
gter, member of the Board of the ACM on 13 November 2013: http://speech-
aníta-vegter- consumer- interest-represeatation- in-the-netherlands . pdf,
Twillem van Boom and Marco Loos, 'Effective enforcement of consumer iaw
in Europe 
- 
private public and collective mechanisms', in \Millem van Boom and
Marco Loos (eds.), Collectàue enforcement oJ consurner law in Europe. Securtng
compliance 'in Europe through pri,uate group act'ion and publi,c authori,tg ,interaen-
tion (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing) 2007, p. 233.
v)
z:lrlttq: / / ec . etropa. eu,/compet Ít ion/ant itrust,/ act i.onsdamages,/ coroparat ive
_xeport_c1ean_en.pdf, p.48. Al1 the websites referred to in this paper'were ]ast
accessed on 10 November 2014.Shttp: //ec . europa. eu/competitlon,/a'titrust/actionsdamages/fi.1es_white
_paper/inpact_study. pdf , p. 2Zl.
- 
:9f -Lidy wiggers-F.'st, 'co-ilectàre' actíons (fulr text onry availabre in Dutch),WODC Cahi,ers 2014-t!, p. 11-12.
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on April 1st 2013. Reasons for this mergeï are budgetary cuts and the
need for a holistic and problem-soiving approach to consumer issues on
the market. Likewise, the office of Fair Ttading in the uK has merged
into the Competition and Markets Authority (CMA).
The ACM is not the sole public enforcer of consumer legislation in
the Netherlands and operates as a secondary enforcer in fields that fall
under the responsibility ofa specialised authorit¡ such as the Authority
for the Financial Markets (AFM) or the Food and consumer product
safety Authority (NVWA). The different pubric authorities responsible
for enforcing consumer legislation collaborate under so-called áoopera-
tion protocols (art. 4.3 consumer protection Enforcement Act). The
ACM is very active in most of the common activities within both the
European consumer Protection and cooperation Network (cpc) and
the International consumer protection and Enforcement Neìwori 1rc-PEN).
The Dutch ACM aims at informing consumers and suppriers about
their rights and duties and options for obtaining legal redìess. It fur-
thermore enforces consumer law in the event of a collective infringement
of the economic interests of all consumers. It goes without saying-that a
certain infringement will only affect (or threaten to affect) the interests
of (an unspecified amount of) consumers who have been confronted (or
would have been confronted) with the reprimanded commercial or con-
tractual practice. Most sanctioned practices target the public at large.
The group of (potentially) affected consumers is therefore generally
quite large. The sanctioning then also serves the pubtic interãst by li-
miting the (potential) economic loss of a great number of consumers
and by increasing consumer trust and the smooth functioning of the
market. In this respect, the enforcement actions by the ACM are the
closest thing to public interest litigation (even though private collective
actions that purport to colrectivery enforce consumer rights indirectly
serve the public interest as well, section III.1).
The impact of non-compliance with consumer iaw on the proper
functioning of markets and consumer welfare determines the ACM,spriorities. The ACM wilr come into action where the totar economic
Ioss_(potentialty) endured by consumers is the highest, where consumer
confidence is most at stake and where market behaviour jeopardises
competition and fairness in a particular market.s over thl next fewyears it will focus on the protection of the online consumer, the heal-
8lbid, p. 2zB-284
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thcare consumer and the e-shopper. It wil enforce the possibility to
switch energy and health insurance providers as it is committed to
develop competition in newly liberarised markets, such as the energv
market.
In view of the primacy of private enforcement, the ACM however
will only take action if private enforcement remains ineffective. The
enforcement of consumer legislation in the Netherlands still bears apredominantly private character. As long as there is no structural vio-
lation of collective interests it is up to the individual consumer to act
against a breach of his rights. Public enforcement bodies will only in-
tervene where the use of private remedies remains ineffective. This is
generally the case where consumers:
- incur no damages (e.g. where the practice only causes annoyance
like in the case of spamming). Individual consumers have no in-
centive to take an action to court. A consumer organisation might
opt for an injunctive action but the fact that the Dutch .onru-
mer association consumentenbond is quite inactive increases the
ACM's scope for aclion.
- incur only low-value damages and damages are scattered (e.g. the
internet speed does not live up to the expectations). The cuirula-
tive collective damage represents a considerable interest but the
costs of an individual procedure outweigh the amount at stake.
since consumers often are not even awaïe about the fact that they
are suffering damages, the incentive to start proceedings is very
low. consumers moïeover are geneïary unable to organìse them-
selves or to attract the funding necessaïy to launch a collective
action
The ACM is entitled to impose fines and orders subject to penarty
payments. It has the power to request documents, to enter busirress
premises, to seize information in both physical and digital form, and to
take statements from employees and managers of companies. The threat
of a potential fine enhances the rate of spontaneous compliance (gb% of
the cases are solved informally). The competence to publish all formal
decisions concerning consumer protection 
- 
and until now all decisions
have been published 
- 
also acts as a deterrent for market parties.
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Recently, the ACM has 'imposed a 
€200,000 fine onKLM Royal Dutch Airli.nes for i,ncorrect prices d,i,splayed,
on ,its webs,ite. On i,ts websi,te, KLM d,i,splayed ai,rfares that
di,d not i,nclude the boolti,ng costs.e Li,ltew,ise, Ryana,ir was
'imposed a f"ne of €370,000 in 2015 for four uiolati,ons of
co nsurnerinfo rmat ion duti,es i,n'its o nl,ine bo otci,ng sy stem.Lo
Dø'isycon wøs recently i,mposed, a fi,ne of €810,000 for u,io-
lati,on of the spam prohi,bi.ti,on. The Dutch charity lotteries
were fi,ned for unnecessari,Iy ønnoy,ing consumers.ll In the
past ø Dutch energy prou,ider wøs fined up to €1 milli,on
for cold-call,ing pract,ices. And an SMS serui,ces prou,id,er
was ,imposed a huge fi,ne (€1.2 million) for not i,nformi.ng
consurners about the fact they were subscribtng to uery
erpens'iu e premi,um s erui, ces.r2
2- criticism on the public enforcement of consumer rights
and how it has been addressed
Administrative enforcement of consumer law has met with criticism as
regards its effectiveness (1) and its alleged disregard for the principle
oflegality (2).
(1) First the sanctions imposed by the ACM were deemed insufficient.
A maximum fine of €28.000 wourd not discourage big traders from
trying to violate consumer legislation. The Act on Enforcement of
consumer Protection has been amended to substantialry raise the
fines. The ACM is now arlowed to issue binding instruãtions and
to impose fines up to 
€450.000 for all violations of consumer legis-
lation. up until this amendment, the ACM courd onry issue fines
up to 
€450.000 in cases concerning unfair commercial practices.
The maximum fine that it could. impose for ail other infringe-
ments was 
€78.000. The ACM has even more recentry (through
the enactment of the streamrining Act) been given thl power to
thttps 
: //r,¡r¡w. acn. nllenlpublications/pubrication/13890/ACM-has-fined-
KLM-f or- incorrectly- displaying- it s-.airf ares/.ruhttps 
: /./r,rww . acm. nI/ en/publications,/publication/11254/Netherla¡ds_Con
su-Eer- Authori.ty- f ines-Ryanair/.
r thttps 
: //r¡rm¡. acn. nllenlpublicati.ons/publ_ication/13345/ACM- inposes_fi
ne-f or-violation-of 
-the- spam-prohibition/.l2https 
: //¡¿r¡.^'. acn. nllenfpubiÍcations/pub ;1icatíon/ 7 347/Consumer-Authority- again- f ines-provider- of 
-SMS- servi ces/.
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issue and publish warnings if it suspects a breach of consumer le_gislation without actuaily hau'ing formaily established n¿, lr*"n,
so as to inform co
mercial practices.îeumers 
as soon as possible about harmful com-
A second criticism as regards it effectiveness pertains to theAcM's very serective approach to the enforcemàt of coo**",legislation (i'e' its_'priorities') and the number of infring;måntsbeing addressed. With regard to the restricted means uiit, ¿ir_posal and in view of the current budgetary cuts, a less selective
approach is not to be expected.
A third criticism rerates to the failure of the Netherrands Authori-ty for the Financial M3rkets (AFM),s regulatory orrerslgfrt i;iireDSB-Bank-case. The schertema commission rras rssuei a .epo.t
on the demise of the DSB Bank. one of its concrusions is thaf tneAFM should have pressed the Dutch Central Bank (DNBj to be
more pro-active and to intervene in the governance of DSB.14
(2) consumer legisration has been transposed into private raw andcontains many general crauses rike the fairness 
""a 
*i.r.uarr.g-
ness tests. origina'y the consumer Authority was not alrowed tofine a business for breaching a general clause and an infringement
of such clauses could onry be tackled thanks to the involveä""i 
"ra civil judge. The public enforcer,s autonomous sanctioning po_
'wers were restricted to the more detailed provisions. civil .ã,rrr,
were considered to be better equipped to dear with the interest-balancing which is inherent to itre åpptication of general 
"larrsàr.This dual enforcement mechanism was however recentiy thrown
overboard.
This choice has been criticised.ls The fact that the same open-textured provisions will be interpreted and applied by both civii and administrative courts can increase legal uncertainty andin view of the principle of legality the breach of general clauses
l3Press release of 4 August 2014, avaiiable at https : //¡,¡nç. acn.nI/enlpubJ.ications/publicat ion/13190/RuIes
- of -the-Netherlands-Authori ty-f or-Consumers
- and-Market s-have-been_ harnonized/\a]nttp / /wr¡v ri jksoverhe id. nl,/documenten- en-pubIi cat ies/rapporten/20 10/06/2e/rapport-va¡.- de- conmissi.e-va¡r
- onderzoek- dsb-bank, htnl.lsCharlotte pavillon,
'Legaliteit en evenredigheid van de sancties op de schen-ding van de open normen uit de \Met oneerlijke handelspraktijkenConsumentenrecht E hand, elsprøktij k en 2OIB-2, pp.63-72 Ti,jd,schrift uoor
should not give way to sanctions for they are not clear and ascer-
tainable enough. Be that as it ma¡ the legislator has decided to
extend the powers of the ACM, which is now entitled to sanction
the breach of general clauses. The ACM no longer has to ask for
an injunction with the Court of Appeal in The Hague by means of
a special procedure. Interestingl¡ the removal of the ACM from
art. 3:305d Dutch civil code (Cc) also means that the ACM is no
Ionger able to obtain injunctive collective redress and thus not
entitled to bring a representative action before a civil court.
III. Private collective enforcement of
consumer rights: collective actions
1. Injunctive and declaratory collective redressl6
collective redress has been available since 19g4. collective redress is ho-
wever limited to (positive mandatory or prohibitory) injunctions, ter-
mination or rescission of contract ord.ers.lz The coliective action can
also be used to obtain a declaratory judgment on the liability of the
defendant.ls The court can however nåt ¿eci¿e on the damage suffered
by the individuals on whose beharf the collective action is bÃught and
may not award monetary compensation. Art. 3:30ba cc cannot Le usedto compel a tortfeasor to compensate.
Only a foundation (sti,chti.ng) or an associ ation (uereni,ging) withfull legal capacity that, according to its articles of associatio'n, "fas theintention to protect specific interests is granted a standing to act and
may bring to court a legal craim that purports to protect s,im,ilar in-
terests of other persons. The coilective action undeiDutch private law
requires that interests can be bundled.le Representativeness is however
not a requirement: a corrective action does not need to rely on the sup-
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16This section is substantially based on lanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong TjinTai 
- 
with support from Karlijn van Doorn, ht tp : //¡¡rm¡. co11ectiveredress org/
coLLe ct ive-redress/ rêport s/thenetherlands/c ollectiveact 10n,lTwillem van Boom, 'Collective Settlement of Mass Claims in the Netherlands,in Matthias Casper, André Janssen , Petra Pohlmann, Reiner Schulze (eds.), Aqfdern Weg zu e,iner europcí,ischen Sammelklage? (Munich: Sellier) 2009, p. 176sECLI:NL: GHAMS: 2074:496 (Stichting BelverliesIeECLLNL'HR,2o1o 8K5756 (Stichting Baas in Eigen Huis/Plazacasa BV)
.214n action regarding consumer protection can be initiated by a foreign organi-
:::l"i.f.j¡^.*ecting consumer interests as inrended in art. 4(3) Direcrive 98/27/EC(...1; j j9?î 
_9.]. -Fbr an example see ECLI: NL:RBBRE: 200d :ÉD6B 1s.
-"t uLI:r\L:HR:2009:BH2I62 (VEB/World Online), g 4.8.2.
port of a substantial portion of the interested parties.2' The interestedindividuals can generary onry be identified in ttre abstract sense arrd
need not have given expiicit authority to the organisation toinstigateproceedings on their beharf. The organisation is*not obrigei io ,",r"urthe identity of the individuars on whose beharf it acts and lheir amount
remains unspecified.21
The promoted interests may be idealistic. The organisation in ques-tion must have the crearry defined statutory aim of p".omoting tto irrt"-
rests concerned and must actualry pursue them. standing to it is oftengranted to special-purpose foundations. The organisation must also ha_
ve tried to reach a settrement over its claim through consultations withthe defendant. A period oftwo weeks after the deféndant har."c"i.r"¿ arequest for such consurtations, indicating what is craimed, ,rruti ir, *r.y
event be sufficient to this end.
Formally the proceedings onry read to a decision between the partiesin the procedure' Thejudgment has res judi,cata effect onry betwËen theparties (and/or the claims adjudicated therein). it doesïoi il; u,ry
res jud,'icata effect in respect of the individuaís on whose behalf theaction was brought. However, the judgment can have consequences for
a person whose interests are protected by the legar action. r"t"*ii"gry,the Dutch Supreme Court has held thÀt a declaratory.;,rag_"rt *uy
serve as a point of departure for new proceed.ings addressin! the sameunlawtul behavior srarred bv other vìctims ("i ,""tior,-äï.2j,;r^ ilri.has for these victims, d,e facto the same effect as res jud,i,cata. Á p"rron
wfrose interests are protected by the legal action may ,opt_out, fråm theeffect of the judgment by simply making clear that he does not want to
Publ'ic 'interest li.tigati,on in the Netherlønd,s
2oECLI:NL:HR:2010:BKb 756 (Stichting Baas in Eigen Huis fPlazacasa$ 4.2. The Commission recommendation of June 11th 2013 is stricterthe legal standing and more specifically the requirement of representativity: ,1nthe co,se of a representat,iue o,cti,on, the legal stand,i,ng to bring the reçrresenta-t'iae act'ion sh,ould, be li,mi,ted, to ad, hoc certi,f,ed, enti,tøes, desi,gnated, repres ent a-tiue entàti,es that fulf,t certa,in criteria s publ,ic authorities. Therepresentatiue entitg should, be requi,red, to proue the ad,m,inástratiue and,al cøpaci,ty to be able to represent the i,nterest of clai,mants i,n an approprtatemanner' (principle 18): http: //eur-1ex europa. eul1egal- content/EN /TXî /HTtiL/?uri=CELEX : 320 13H039 6\&fro¡o=EN
et bg løw or to
95
BV),
as regards
f,nanci,-
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be affected by the decision (there are no formal requirements).23 This
does only play a role when individuals do not wish (for example) to
have an injunction regarding acts that they approve of.
A recent consunler case grounded, on arti,cle S:505a Cc as
the cøse oppos'ing The Netherlands State Lottery $taats-loterij) and the Lottery Loss foundati,on (Loterijaerl,ies).2a
Th,e Hague Court found, i,n the foundation,s fauor and, ruled,
that the conxpany had mi,sled, consumers for a peri,od, of up to
seaen years. The case concerned, o,duertisements by the state
Iottery between the years 2000 and, 2007 whi,ch referced, to a
set number of guaranteed, big prize w,inners for eøch d,raw,
euen though there was no guarantee that the prizes could, be
uon s,ince the majori,ty of the lots had not been sold,. pr,ices
were d,rawn from 21 milli,on lots and only S milli,on had, be_
en sold. Both parties haue appealed to the Dutch Supreme
Court wl¿i.ch upheld the appellate court jud,gment on Janu-
ary 30th 2015.25 To be able to collectiuely claim d,amages
consum,ers w,ill haae to ach,ieue a settlement agreement or
to aggregate the,ir clai,ms.
Another, less successful, ørticle S:505a Cc-case, ,in the sen_
se that most cla,ims were rejected,, i,s the cøse oppos,ing the
Sti,chti,ng Beluerl'ies to mob'ile phone operators Telfort and
KPN about m,inute bi,Ili,ng.26 In 200g_2010, KpN swi,tched
to mi,nute bi,lli,ng ,in new subscr,iption plans. Its subs,id,,iary
Telfort made the same change but appli,ed, i,t to etisting sui-
script'ion plans as well. In the ruli,ng i,n fi,rst ,instance, the
court found that Telfort had i,nsuffici,ently informed eri,stzng
customers, but rejected all the other cla,¿ms from Sti,chti,ng
Beluerl,ies, the group set up by the affected, customers. In the
Iatest ruli,ng on appeal, the court took the same d,eci,s,ion, as
no new ,informati,on was presented. The court, howeuer, di,d,
z3unless the nature of the judiciar decision brings arong that it is not possible
to exclude this specific person from its efiect: pcr,l:ñl:HR:1010:BK5z56 lsiichtingBaas in Eigen Huis/Plazacasa BV).2aECLI:NL:GHDHA:2018:cAoúaz 
lsticnting Loterijverries.nr/stichting Exproi-tatie Nederlandse Staatsioterij).
25EcLI,NL:HR:2015:128 
1s-ii"htit g Loterijverlies.nl/stichting Exploitatie Neder_landse Staatsloterij ).26ECLI'NL,RBAMS: 2012:BybgsB (Srichting Belverlies/KpN).
not rule out the possi,bCli.ty of damages forit cons,id,ered, cau_
sat'ion to be establ,ished (on an abstract leuet).27 As a result,
the l5 i,ndi,uzd,ual compla,inants who were already customers
of Telfort in 2008 may present, a case for d,amiges.
It is not clear why in some cases ârt. 3:305a Cc_proceedings arebeing instigated by an interest group. one parameter is the readiness
of consumers to organise themserves or the emergence of one or morefoundatio.ns that is/are wiling to take the action ìo court. The availa-bility of funding is another essential parameter. The Dutch consumer
association consumentenbond ís quite cautious in taking legar action
because, among other things, of its limited resources.zr u,t"rr-"rtu¡rirrr"¿
consumer organisations are excruded from pubric support.2e Most cor-lective actions are started by special pn.po.u foundaìions. These foun-dations have a commerciar interest in the outcome and are attractedby potential gains. It strikes me that in most proceedings instigated by
consumer groups the charenged infringement can indeeã resurã (or has
already resulted) in the award of (pecuniary) damages (tnr-o'"gh trr"
aggregation of claims, a coilective settrement or individuat fori'ow-onproceedings). The fact that in some cases the damages incurred are oflow-value (cf. the state lottery and minute-biling Jurur¡ Jo", ui nrrt
sight not (always) constitute a barrier to a collective iniiiative.
2. Test cases
A so-called test case is generalry rneant to clarify the issue of liability
and to allow for the identification and decision on the comrlon,issues of
several claims. under Dutch procedurar law, there is no regar prã"i.ion
allowing for a test case with res jud,'icata between tire parties. A fewinformal pilot proceedings have however been initiated.bo A test case
27ECLI:NL: GHAMS:2014:496 (Stichting Betverlies/KpN).2SThese organisations might arso be afra"id that a suboptimai resurt wourd read tonegative publicity and harm their reputation. Their position is even more vulnerablebecause they must ask for a financiàl contribution.29And this shourd remain this way since'regulatory and, semi,-regulatorg agenc,iesmight appear as d'efend,ants i,n coilecti,ue crai,ri.s, meaning that the"state 
^oylo"" oconfløct o.f i,nterest in determzni,ng the fund* thát are auailabre to the representatiueentrtg for the pend,ing cra'im or for future cla,ims': European Lr* Irr"t'it,_,iã,-r-¡tStaten¿ent on ColLectiae Red,ress anà Competi,tion Domige, Ctal,mi,;.;1-'30ECLI'NL:HR:2009:8H2815; ECLI:Ni,:HR:200ì:8H2811; ECLI:NL:HR:2009:8H2822.
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claim is usually based on the general rules of either wrongful act orproduct liability and brought by a rimited number of aggrievä p".ror.r,
while a representative organisation might coordinate the action änd pay
related costs.31
3. Aggregation of damages claims
A group proceeding that can iead to the award of damages is the vo_luntary pooling of individuar claims, either by assignmeni of the ctaim
or by giving mandate to a representative organisátion (the assignee,
often a foundation) that wourd fire the craim on beharf of the individu-
al consumers (the assignors).32 Aggregation of individual consumers,
claims can be viewed as'informar opt-ln tlñgat¿on.Bs rJnàe; o"î.rr-ru*,this type of proceedings-is governed by thl general provisions regar-ding mandate and transfer and applicuut" to ail kinds of claims. The
standing to act of the mandated/assigned organisation depends on the
standing of the claimants represented. It is for e*ample possible to
combine the declaratory judgment obtained on the basis of a coirective
action (section III.1) with an aggregated claim for damages.
The system has met two criticisms.aa First, the systeiã is comprica-ted since the foundation_must be able '(i,f asked foi proof) to piouid,ethe i,d,enti,ty of aII specific cla,imants anà da,ims in ordei'to proue i,ts
mandate and/or the transfer of uati,d cla,ims,. That means that for eachand every individual aggrieved party, an assignment document or amandate must be prepared and vaüály signed ihi"h, in practile, canbe burdensome'3' The rarger the group'vic'tims', the bumiier this road¡e $am]S_ej will be. Aggregation is intìicate from a togistiåal perspecti_
ve but difficulties arise also insofar as individuars are reticent to revealtheir identity to avoid undue pressure. second, there is a rack of contror
31Ka.e., Jelsma and Manon Cordewener, 'The Settlement of Mass Claims: A HotTopic in The Netherlands,
, The Internati,onal Law Quarterly (20i1), p. i3.32ECLI,NL:G HAMS:2008:8F0810 (Stichting spirit)33willem tan Boom, 'Recente ontwikkelingen in de collectieve private handha-ving', in Marco Loos and \Ã/illem van Boom, Hand,haø,ing aan het consurroentenrecht(preadviezen Vereniging voor Burgerli jk Recht 2009) (Deventer: Kluwer) 2010, g 3.13alanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai with support from Karli_jn van Doorn, http: //l¡wrr. collecti veredres s . org/ col 1e ct ive 
-redres s/report s,/thenetherl-ards/nandat e.3sKaren Jelsma and Manon Cordewener, 'The Settlement of Mass Claims: A HotTopic in The Netherlands,
, The Internati.onal Law euarterly (2011), p. 13.
on foundations acting as assignee.so People behind those foundationsmight put their own intereststefore the interests of the craimants.
4. The absence of a collective compensatorv
redress mechanism
The objective nature of cotective redress accgunfs for the impossib'ityunder Dutch law to claim. damages (art. 3:30ba(3) C"). e Sriïp'¿r*_ages claim is deemecr problematic gìven alr of the different individuaicircumstances of the aggrieved pu.iiu, invorved.B7 
'r. 
;;;;, ;;ïu"i uclaim depend on the circumstanc"r rrr.rourrding each claimant. A courtwill not always be able or willing to abstract from these circumstanceswhen establishing tortious behav-ior vis-à-vis consumers) a vitiated con_sent or causation between the ateged harm and tn" uit"g"J ,rr.rawfulconduct by the professionar.38 othá issues that shourd be assessed onan individuar rever are the period of rimitation, the extent of the dama-ges, contributory fault or the obligation to limit damages.That being said, couective actiáns have been successfur in obtalningdeclaratorv rerief as to certain facts and issues of (tortious) Iiab'ity ona coliective basis' The öreach of a speciar duty of care was'for u*u-ptuestablished in an art' 3:305a cc-procedure even arthough the concretefacts underlying the aggregated craims differed.Be under Dutch raw de-ciaratorv or injunctive relief can easitv be outained il ;";; öo*u,to be willing to assess wrongfulnes, on un abstract level. A court how-ever has never ruled rhar a defendanr is legaily tiubte ,o;;;;å,rrututhese individuals.4o
Difficurties thus arise when it comes to the co'ective award of dam-ages' The voluntary assignment of ciaims (an informar opt-in moder)
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36Cf. willem van Boom, 'Recente ontwikkeiingen in de collectieve private hand-having', in Marco Loos and Willem van Boom, Hand,hauzng aan het consumenten-recht, (pread,uzezen Verenigøng Burgerl,ijk Recht 2009) (Deventer Kluwer) 2010,uoôrp. 167 ff.
37wil1em van Boom. ,Crcllective Interests, ,prêt à porter, Justic e?,, ErasmusLau Reai,eu, Vol. 1(2), izoos;, p. r-¿ if." 
"îä"'*ã"r ro, rhe rescission of multiplecontracts on the basis of ¡rnconscionability. mistaie. or misrepresentalion.3sECLI,NL,GHAMS:2f
sign^ee/rransfe ,"u r""rr¿orll¿:8F0810 
(Stichting spirit): the rå""¿"iìãl *"s rhe as-
3e EC Ll:NL:HR:2009 :BH2B22 ( Sprinr plan ).aowilrem van Boom, 'couecti,re-setïù-åit 
.r Mass craims in the Netherlands,,in Matthias Casper, André Janssen, p*r. Þ"frì*å..rn,. Reine. Schulze (eds.), ,42/dem weg zu einer europdischen s"*^;iik;";?'inni,",.n' Seilier) 2009, p. 176.
does not appear to be a full-fledged alternative for the missing collective
compensatory redress mechanism (section III.3). The art. 3:3bba cc ac-
tion therefore generally paves the way to a voluntary settrement. onceliability is established, the foundation moves to settle claims under the
Dutch Act on collective settrement of Mass Damages claims (wcAM).
The wcAM marks the first notable legisrative attempt at designing
an effective collective consumer compensation procedure based o.-n an
opt-out model. A defendant is likery to take their seat around a nego-
tiating table if:
- individual victims are rikery to individualy prove damage and
causation;
- individual victims will in fact pursue their individual claims;
- the benefits to the tortfeasor of negotiating individual settlement
outweigh the costs.al
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41Ibid, p. I77
*'Bari Krans, 'The Dutch Act on Collective Settlement of Mass Damages',27 Pac. McGeorge Gtobat Bus. 
€j Deu. L.J. (2014), p. 281-801.a3http; / /eur-lex. europa
IV. A Dutch particularity: the binding
collective setilement of mass
damages claimsa2
1. A collective agreement binding on all interested persons
collective compensatory redress prevents a murtitude of individuar
claims exerting undue pressure on court efficiency. Member states areinvited in the commission Recommendation of 11 June 2013 on com-
mon principles for injunctive and compensatory coriective redress mech-
anisms in the Member states concerning viorations of rights granted
under union Law of June 11th 20r}4s tolnclude an opt-in mod"er withgroup members having to be identified before a claim is brought. Thereis no such mechanism in Dutch law. Dutch law however prärrides fo,
an opt-out mechanism that makes collective settlements binding on allinterested parties. This mechanism was created by the Dutch äct on
collective settlement of Mass Damages craims 1úcau; *rrict came
R_NSo013.
eul1egal- content / EN / TXl/ ?uri=0 J I J0L_20 13_20 1_
, ,48Remedies include, primarily, monetary damages, but may include also otherobligations that require specific perfort".""";;; ti*e are considered to be com-pensation of damage in kind. Claims ho_errer need not 
";;;;;;;_;Jåutio'but may for example arso relate-to ottu..ight.-ir remedies rike a reduction indebts to the bank or other kinds of ;;;";;ï;å, such as declaring contracts
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into force on 2T Jury 2005. Although it was drafted to address masspersonal injury claims, the Act has been more successfur in settiing
mass claims based on securities litigation.aa
A wcAM proceeding is, unlike the us class action, not initiatedby a lead plaintiff, i.e. 'a singre representative craimant assisteã by aclass counsel operating on a contingency fee basis,.a5 rt is ùaseJår, trrevoluntary cooperation between partìes. itttrough the wcAM alows forthe settlement of mass claims, it provides no authority to bring craimson behalf of a group. The settlement agreement must be concludedbetween one or more potentially liable pãrties, and one or more foun_dations or associations representing oneãr more groups having suffereddamage'ao It is based on damages-scheduring and incrudes the right toclaim damages from the. liable party or maybe the setup of a coÃpen_sation fund. The fund administratoi/trusteå w'r generaliy arso ,ig'*r"contract. During the negotiations some of the qiestions il.ãi nãr*ar_ly need individuar ansv/ers are being objectified. euestions .orr""rrrirrgloss estimations, the nature and exient of damage and causation w'rbe dealt with collectively.
The WCAM provides the parties to an amiable settlement agree_ment with the possibility of joinily requesting 
- 
i.e. firing-u pui'irio'to 
- 
the Amsterdam court of Appear to decrarã their setìie'n erriär.""-ment binding on ali interested puiti". (except those that opt_o,rti. fn"perition iniriaring this appiicarion musì ue nle¿ afu"iliËi"ääiä*n,
representing the victims and, the parties that are herd riableaz and/orwili provide compensation.as The proceedings before the court will not
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deal with the event or events that caused damages and are referred to
in the contract. It will only focus on the settlement agreement. No pre-
vious judgment on the liability of the 'defendant' is required, although
it is easier to clarify the issue of liability first, for example with a test
case, before negotiating the settlement.
The Deri,a-c&se concerned financi,al damages suffered by r,n-
di,uzd,uals as a result of alleged,Iy m,islead,,ing i;nformation pro-
ui,ded by Deria Banlt, regard,i,ng certai.n of i,ts financ,ial pro-
ducts. The Shell-case concerned financ,ial damøges allegedly
suffered by Shell sharehold,ers as a result of mi,sleading i,nfor-
mat'ion by SheII'in relation to certai,n of i,ts oi,l and, gas reser-
ues in 2001. Sharehold,ers erperienced a si,gni,fi,cant drop i,n
share ualue when,it was d,iscouered that Shell had, arti,fici,alty
i,nfl,ated o'il reserue statements i,n ,its past annual accounts.
Shell seemed, to agree that reach,ing ø European settlement
rather than pursu,ing the American class act'ion would be be-
nefici,al to all (European) parties ,inuolued such as the Dutch
pens'ion funds ønd, the Dutch Shørehold,ers Assoc,iation.
2. An opt-out model
If a collective settlement is agreed upon by both parties, the Amster-
dam Court of Appeal can make that settlement binding in relation
to the entire group of victims under the WCAM. After court approval,
the settlement agreement will bind all harmed parties falling within the
scope of the settlement agreement and included in the terms of the sett-
lement as persons potentially eligible for compensation, whether known
or unknown and whether residing in The Netherlands or abroad.ae
Those persons can use their right to opt-out from a collective set-
tlement if they prefer not to be bound by it. The period within which a
written opt-out declaration has to be made is determined by the Court,
but lasts at least three months. The settlement must specify for which
null and void (e.g. ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZT0B3 (Dexia)). ,It is not possi,ble to
obta'in the rerned,i.es that only a court càn proaid,e (such as a d,eclaratory jud,g-
ment, ønjunction, non-compLi,ance penalty set by th,e court), although the contrac-
tual obligati'ons rnaa o,nount to the satne': ranlka Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin
Tai 
- 
with support from Karlijn van Doorn, http://wwr,r.correctiveredress.org/
collective-redress/reports/thenetherlands/thecollectivesettlement.
4eCf. ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:8V1026 (Converium).
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claimants the settlement holds and the grounds for the claim. The court
who subsequently decides on the case of those who have opted-out may
deviate from the settlement.so
Notification of the persons on whose behalf the settiement was con-
cluded is therefore of paramount importance 'both at the l,itigation stage,
where the ai,m i,s to obta'in a bind,i,ng ileclarati,on, as well as after the
bi'ndi'ng d'eclarat'ion has been i,ssued,. The bi,nd,i,ng effect of a seitlement
agreement 'is only regard,ed as acceptable i,f the ,interested, persons haue
been properly noti,fi'ed at both stages, and thus haae had, an opportunitg
to object and to opt-out so they can pursue the,ir own ind,i,ai,iial cla,irns
'in court'.5|
3. The assessment by the Amsterdam Court of Appeal
a) The representativity-test
Before granting the application, the court will test, among other things,
the representativity of the foundation(s) and association(s) repïesen-
ting the interested persons. The interest of the group thai thã orga-
nisation is seeking to protect must be covered by its articles of asso-
ciation. This test goes further than the admissibility test in 3:305a-
proceedings (cf. section IILl), which is justified insofar as those actions
do have limit-ed repercussions on the rights of individuals to pursue
their claims.5z
under the wcAM the court has to materially assess whether the
representing entity has a non-profit making character, whether its ar-
ticles of association allow the action to be instigated and whether the
interests of the group member are sufficiently and adequately protec-
ted. The request will be denied if the representative o.ganiåaiior. or
organisations together are not sufficiently representatiue of the whole
group. The assessment does however not entail any formal ,certifica-
tion'. Informal requirements such as a certain board. composition and
solanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai 
- 
with support from Karlijn vanDoorn, http : //r¡r¡w. collectiveredress . org/corlective-redress/reports/it 
"n"therlands/thecorlectivesettlement with reference to ECLI:NL:HR,i00g,BHzBl5;
ECLI:NL:HR:2009:BH2B1i; ECLi:NL:HR:2009:BH2g22 (deviation from the Dexia-
settlement).
51Ruud Hermans and Jan de Bie Leuvering Tjeenk, 'Internationar crass Action
settlements in the Netherlands since converium', The Internatáonal cornparatiue
Leg-al Guid,e to: Class ü Group Acti,ons p015, p. b (g S).52ELI, Draft Statement, p. 19 (fn. 23).
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a financial accounting system have been laid d.own in a non-binding
'ciaimcode'.53
b) Thereasonableness-test
The judicial review of the settlement agreement also includes a
reasonableness-test. The Amsterdam court of Appeal decides whether
the amount.of compensation awarded in the settlement agreement is
reasonable.sa The reasonableness-test takes into consideraiion, among
other things, the extent of the damage, the simpiicity and speed with
which the compensation can be obtained (the expected strength of the
claim in court) and the possible causes of the damage.55 Sãttlement
agreements may differentiate between different categories of harmed
parties on the basis of these criteria.s6
In practice, the reasonableness-test boils down to a marginal assess-
ment for it only recapitulates the arguments laid down in thã agreement
without substantively reflecting on them.57 The court for exJmple re-
mains hesitant about ruling that a group of parties *u, *rorrlly irr-
53http 
: //r,¡¡,¡r,2. consunentenbond 
. nl/over/wie 
_zi j n_we,/claimc ode/.54Ruud Hermans and Jan de Bie Leuveling tjeerrt, ,InternationaÌ crass Action
settlements in the Netherrands since corr.r".i,rm;, The Internationat Co,mparaü.ue
Leg_al Guide to: Class 
€! Group Acti,ons p015, p. g fr.55In ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:8V1026 (con"i.rum), the court rured that arÌ cir-
cumstances ane relevant, including those circumstances which occurred after thedetermination of the amount of compensation or after the concrusion of the settre-
ment ($ 6.2).
56Ruud Hermans and Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, ,International crass ActionSettlements in the Netherlands since Corr.r"ril*;, The Internati,onaL ComparatiaeLegal Guód,e to: class 
€! Group Acti,ons p7rs, p.9. since the wcAM ailows thatthe strength of the claim ín court is taken into account in fixing the amount of
compensation (see the shell decision ECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:By9Bão an¿ the bexiadecision ECLI:NL:GHAMS:2007:AZT03B) the court wilr have to assess the reason-
ableness of the settlement partry by having regard to severar foreign iu*. ,on.
can imagine i'nternat'ionar cases ,in which ttte sittlement agreernent d,i,fferentiatesbetween partzes resød,i'ng 'in d,i,fferent countries, on the bøsi.s that their äo¿*, noo"
a d,i,fferent ualue und,er tlte løws that apptg i,n each of tlrei,r cases,,
- 
s'Qarla Kraassen, 'De ror van ¿" (e"*ijiigal wceu bij de coilectieve afwikke-ling van massaschade ,en nog wat van die'dilgen,, Ars Aequi, (20I8),p. 633 (g 
 
.1).some scholars however disagree with this (doáinant) 
"pi"iã"'."å1iriiu"1" ì"¡" ""_sessment of the fairness of the agreed compensation a more extensive nature. seeBart Krans, 'The Dutch Act on colrective settlement of Mass Damages,, 2T pac.McGeorge Global Bus. ü Dea. L.J. (2014), p. 298 (fn. 153).
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cluded in, or excluded from the terms of the settrement.ss It does not
so much test whether such rimitation is rea,sonabre but whether it isnot 'incomprehensibre'. yet, it is not deemed unreasonable thaf ã sett_lement does not grant fulr compensation of the au-ug* u.-o.igirrury
claimed by the harmed parties because of inequarities ii the bargîirrirrgpositions of the partieó involved.se The court arso herd that the itr"rr"u
of a hardship clause (that would arow a more individual approach to-
wards victims than provided for by the settremerrt ugr"u*åt) in the
settlement agreement did not make it unreasonabl".60" -
V. The up- and downside of the -WCAM
and the need for amendments
The wcAM-sorution paradoxicalry remains unsatisfactory. Its successhas had its drawbacks (section IV.4) and shourd not be orr"."Ji*u-t:d l!-will become apparent that there is room for improvement (sec-tion IV.5). In the next sections I wilr eraborate on the shortcomings
of the wcAM and on the extent to which the draft bil ,Amenãmentsto the civil code, the code of civil procedure and the BankruptcyAct to further facilitate the coilective settrement 
"i-;; ;tl,'*rior orJuly 2013 has remedied them.
1. The WCAM: victim of its own success?
In the 2008 Euatuati,on of the effect'iueness and ffici,ency of corlectiue
red'ress n'¿echan'isms in the European (Jnion one ãr trr. most positive
experiences from a consumer raw perspective was reported from theNetherlands..2 The Dutch mechanism is an exception insofar as it pro-
vides a significantly higher direct benefit to affected 
"orrrrr-"Ã. ¡utu
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from the Netherlands \Mas systematicaliy excluded from the analysis
because it was considered as an outlier. The WCAM has allowed for
a 'sw'ift settlernent af mass securi,t'ies clai,ms' and appears to ensure
an efficient resoiution of mass damage claims.63 A few major cases in-
volving major companies such as Shell and Dexia were settled in the
Netherlands for significant amounts.
a) The proliferation of foundations
The success of the WCAM however led to a proliferation of founda-
tions: after the bankruptcy of DSB Bank in October 2009 approxima-
tely 12 foundations were established. The Dutch jurisdiction is quite
permissive as regards interest group standing.64 WCAM negotiations
and procedures are often started by special purpose foundations. It has
been suggested that some ad hoc foundations may actually not provide
proper service for their clients, even if they are representative.6s Some
foundations are guilty of 'entrepreneurial lawyering' and responsible
for the creating of a 'market for lemons' as described by the econo-
mist Akerlof in 'The Market for Lemons: Quality Uncertainty and the
Market Mechanism'. Participating consumers will not recognise more
expensive services as better ones.
The regulation of the quality of representative organisations is there-
fore crucial for the private collective enforcement of consumer rights.
Such regulation could entail better information for consumers and
stricter requirements for market access.66 The Dutch legislator chose
63Tomas Arons and \Miliem van Boom, 'Beyond T\rlips and Cheese: Exporting
Mass Secu¡ities Claim Settlements from the Netheriands', European Business Law
Reui.ew (2010), p. 857 tr.
6awillem van Boom and Marco Loos, 'Effective enforcement of consumer law
in Europe 
- 
private public and collective mechanims', in Willem van Boom and
Marco Loos (eds.), Collect'iue enforcernent of consumer lo,w'in Europe. Securi,ng
eornpliance ,in Europe tltrough prinate group action and publi,c øuthority i,nteruen-
úion (Groningen: Europa Law Publishing) 2007, p. 247.
65Cf Wille* ran Boom, 'Recente ontwikkelingen in de collectieve private hand-
having', in Marco Loos and Willem van Boom, Hønd,hauøng uan het consumenten-
recht (pread,ui,ezen Vereni,g'ing uoor Burgerli,jlc Recht 2009) (Deventer: Kluwer) 2010,
p. 168-169.
66lbid, p. 171. Van Boom suggested that an individual, a supervisory authority
ot a new organisation (a11 outsiders) could ask for a reasonableness-test (at the
cost of the settling parties). He reckoned that this suggestion would however most
likely collide with the rule that no one has an action without ,sufficient interest,(art. 3:303 Cc).
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to tighten the standing requirements. The amendment to the WCAM
contains additional quality requirements for interest groups that stand
up for victims. In assessing whether the interests are safeguarded, courts
must pay adequate attention to the extent to which the parties ultima-
tely benefit from the collective action ifit is assigned and to the question
whether the organisation has sufficient knowledge and skills to perform
the procedure (past performances, number of members, other activities
deployed by the organisation to help and assist its members such as
gaining media attention). organisations should also abide by the code
of conduct established in 2011 (the claimcode): the three pilars of the
claimcode are (a) the promotion of collective interests, non-profit, (b)
an independent board without interest, and (c) transparency about the
income of the foundation.
A drawback of these stricter rules might be that fewer actions are
started, especially in view of the limited preparedness of established
consumer organisations to get involved in collective procedures (sec-
tion III.1).
b) The Netherlands as ,favored venue,67
The wcAM procedure is available in cross-border cases, as long as the
representative organisations are also sufficiently representative for for-
eign claimants.6s In sheli the court assumed jurisdiction with regard to
all interested parties, regardless of their domicile. In the interim (and
provisional) decision in converium the court did not even require that
any of the potentially liable entities was established in the Nether-
iands.6e The WCAM can thus be used in cases where a majority of
claimants is not Dutch and where the liable party has no ties to the
.Tlanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai 
- 
with support from Karlijn van
Doorn, http : //¡¡r¡¡'r. collectivered.ress , org/co1r-ective-red.ress,/reports/thenet
herla¡ds/thecollectivesettlenent; Tomas Arons and willem van Boom, ,Beyond
Tulips and cheese: Exporting Mass securities claim settlements from the Nether-
Iands', European Bus,iness Law Reuieu (2010), p. 852 tr.6SECLI:NL:RBDHA:2013:8y9850 (Shell).
6e In ECLI:NL: GHAMS :2012:BV10i6 (Converium), the Court assumed j urisdic_
tion and declared an international collective settiement binding in a case where none
of the two potentially liable parties was Dutch (they were both swiss), and where
only a limited number of the potential ciaimants were domiciled in the Netherlands.
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Netherlands, as long as the Court of Appeal is competent to decide all
claims under the settlement.To
In Converium, the court however also considered that sonxe conrrec-
tion with the Netherlands was required, namely one or more interested
persons should be domiciled in the Netherlands and one or more pe-
titioners should be Dutch entities.Tl In large international cases, since
there will often be one or more interested persons who are domiciled
in the lt{etherlands, this requirement will easiiy be met. Foreign indi-
viduals in such a case must be notified of the proceedings, given the
requirements of art. 6 ECHR.72 WCAM proceedings are very useful
in reaching binding settlements in cross-border cases which, in view of
the successes booked may lead to 'ciass settlement tourism' and forum-
shopping.T3
There has been criticism on the fact that a Dutch court may bind a
large number of parties abroad without their explicit consent (that is,
except if the parties enter the proceedings or send an opt-out declara-
tion in time),74 even if the nationai legal system of the claimant and/or
liable party does not allow for a loss of ciaim without an individual
court procedure.Ts Because of the pressure on the Dutch judiciary and
in view of this criticism, the emergence of Dutch courts as a forum in
which parties can settle cross-border mass claims should be restrained.
c) Fìrnding issues and (possible) freeriding
From the perspective of the consumers and the Consumentenbond,
the funding in the Dexia-case was successful, and this success can be
Tolanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai 
- 
with support from Karlijn van
Doorn) http: //r^¡¡¡¡,¡. collectiveredress . org/collective-redress,/reports/thenet
herla¡ds/thecollect i.vesettlement.
71Ruud Hermans and Jan de Bie Leuveling Tjeenk, ,International Class Action
settiements in the Netheriands since Converium', The Interno,tional cornparati,ue
Leg_ql Guid,e to: CLass 
€l Group Actions 2015, p. 10 (0 40).72ECLI'NL'GHAMS:2012:8V1026 (Converium).
T3carla Klaassen, 'De ro1 van de (gewijzigdel wc,Lu bij de collectieve afwikke-
iing van massaschade 'en nog wat van die dingen,, Ars Aequi, (2018), p. 68Z. See
also Astrid stadler, 'The commission's Recommendation on common principles of
collective redress and private interriational law issues', Ned,erland,s Internaiionaal
Pri¡¡.a¿¿7".¡¡, Vol. 4 (2013), p. 485.TaECLI:NL:GHAMS:2012:BV1026 (Converium).
'"lanika'-['zankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai * with support from Karlijnvan
Doorn, http: //i,rr¡v. collectiveredress . org/corlecti.ve-redress/reports/ihenet
herla:rds/theco1le ct ivesettlement.
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explained by the fact that many consumers have been willing to contri-
bute to the litigation fund, and to the collective resolution of the matter.
The question arises whether the Dexia-success will repeat itself.76 con-
sumers might think they wiil benefit from the initiated actions anyv/ây
and become'foeeriders'.
Legal aid, Iegal expense insurance and third party funding were alì
used in the Dexia-case. Third party litigation funding (TpF)zz is under-
developed in the Netherlands. It is criticised for having a potentially
negative impact on how the consumers' interests are being defended
but the first two types of funding are not always available. The ques-
tion however is whether a mass consumer damages case is ,interesting
enough' for TPF.
2. The remaining shortcomings: \Mhere the WCAM fails
a) Success is relative: no settlements of mass
low-value damages
The success of the \MCAM lies in the number of claimants and overall
amount of damages awarded. Damages have however only been awarded
in a few cases. In view of the diversity of unfair or unlawful commercial
practices and the high number of (mostly low-value) damage cases, the
reiative share of the wcAM in the enforcement of consumer rights re-
mains relatively small. The Dexia consumer securities lease case was the
only 'consumer' case: this case pertained to financial damages suffered
by individuals as a result of allegedly misreading information provided
by Dexia Bank regarding certain of its financial products.zs
only seven applications have been brought to the court since the
wcAM's inception. why is that? The first reason appeaïs to be that
there are not many claims involving a significant number of individuals.
second, not all claims involving a significant number of individuals
need to recourse to the specific wcAM procedure. some can be settled
with a common settlement agreement (in particular when not too many
?6lanika Tzankova, 'Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands,,
8 J-L. Econ. 
€! Pol,s (2012), p. 5S9.//A third party pays the costs of litigation and in return, if the case succeed.s,
receives a percentage of the proceeds: Ianika Tzankova, ,F\nding of Mass Disputes:
Lessons from the Netherlands,, 8 J.L. Econ. 
€! pol,y (2012), p.:b6_552.78The vie d'or-case regarding frnancial ross arlegeàly ,únu.ea by iife insurancepolicy holders as a consequence of the bankruptcy of a life insurance company did
not pertain to consumer law.
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individuals are involved).7e Therefore not all settrements are subjected
to a WCAM proceeding.sO Furthermore, the WCAM only applies where
a settlement has been reached with a representative party, and this is
a further barrier (section V.2.b)).
Many (I would even dare say most) breaches of consumer protection
lav¡s lead to dispersed trifle losses where the possible benefits of clai-
ming are outweighed by the transactional cost of pursuing a complaint
and trying to reach a settlement. The wcAM has never been used in
real large-scale low-value damage cases where diffuse consumer interests
are involved. The incentive for consumers to organise themselves is low
and if special purpose vehicles see the 1ight of day, consumers might
not be willing to contribute to their funding in view of the low vaiue of
their claim and because they expect others will ,pay' (section V.1.c)).
The risk of freeriding is reinforced by the smair vaiue of the dama-
ges. There are, however, a few examples of collective redress actions
based on art. 3:305a cc that relate to what can be seen as low-vaiue
damages (cl. the state lottery and minute-billing cases).
b) The reluctance to negotiate
The low success rate of the wcAM in consumer cases also lies in the re-
luctance of major companies to recognise their liability and to negotiate
compensation without a threat of litigation. one of the shortcomings
of the wcAM is its voluntary nature. potential liable parties are not
always willing to negotiate a collective settlement agreement. If one of
the parties denies liability or disagrees on key legal issues, it is difficult
to reach a settlement.
The readiness to negotiate may increase if both parties know as ear-
Iy as possibie what their chances are in the process. To this end, pre-
liminary referrals to the Dutch supreme court are now possible (since
Jury 2012) - Another way to increase the preparedness to negotiate ìs the
pre-procedural hearing that has been introduced by the amendment of
the wcAM. If a person hetd liabre under an articre 3:30ba cc-procedure
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TeIanika Tzankova and Eric Tjong Tjin Tai 
- 
with support from Karlijn vanDoorn, http : //r^ri,¡r¡. cor-r.ectiveredress 
. orþlcollective-red.ress,/reports/ihenet
herla¡rds/thecô11e cti-vesettlenent.80wil1em van Boom, 'Recente ontwikkeringen in de co[ectieve private handha-
ving', in Marco Loos and willem van Boom, Hand,haui,ng uan hàt consu,¡nenten-
recl^rt (pread,uzezen vereni'gøng uoor Burgerr,ijte Recht cooo) (nevent"r, Nt,r*"r)"zoro,p. I70-I71.
refuses to enter into negotiations about a mass damages craim, Dutchlaw provides for a mechanism to force that person to appear before the
court in a so-called pre-hearing. where parties do not 
-unug. to cometo an agreement, one or more of the parties may request that the com-petent court holds a pre-triar meeting. The purpose of such a hearingis to support the parties in their negotiations, for example by assistingin the formulation of the settrement agreement or encouraging the ap-pointment of an expert in a particurar fierd. The (support"ini) rore ofthe courts in making the agreement binding ir .o"ri¿åÀury iiáreased.
However, no mechanism exists under Dutch raw to force a person
heid liable to actual coilective redress of a mass damages craim. Trre-
re is still no possibility for interest groups to bring craims for damage
compensation on behalf of consumers. In the event that the (poten_tially) liable parties do not consent to a collective settlement'or failto achieve such a settlement there is no 'stick, at hand. The wcAM-
solution remains restricted to cases where parties .were able to achieve a
settlement. Thus, in large-scale low-value cases where individuals would
not sue in court, a settlement may not be reached.
c) A suboptimal compensation: the many opt-outs
in the Dexia-case
If the parties are willing and abre to reach a settrement agreement, the
result might not be optimal for the harmed consumers. -A settlement
will normally not resurt in fuil compensation of the iosses as origìnariypresented by the claiming parties. In fact, settrements, as in the"Dutch
system, always represent a compromise between the parties so that the
Rayable amount is generally less than fuli compensation.
The Dutch country study has reveared that in the Dexia-case some
of the individual claimants who have opted out from the settlement (andhave continued individuar ritigation) are most likeiy to obtain better
compensation than those victims who have decided not to opt-out.The settlement was criticised for being unfavorabre for consumers with
spouses who were not aware of the contracts.sl More than 20,000 con-
sumers opted out from the coilective settiement (reading to túe above-
mentioned test-cases in order to obtain some guidance as to how to
resolve those cases out of court). The settlement reached bv the con-
sllanika Tzankova,
B J.L. Econ. 
€! Pot'y .^|1i9i"S of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands,,(2012), p. s78.
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sunxentenbond was criticised for not being optimal and it has become
quite cautious in taking the lead in subsequent actions. It might not be
willing to act in the future.82 Special purpose vehicles will have to see
the light of day.
3. Conclusion
The amendments to the WCAM have only partially solved the problem
of 'the market for lemons' and that of the missing ,stick,. Nonetheless,
many problems still need to be addressed. These amendments however
are only the first step in a two-step reform of the Dutch collective
redress mechanism giving effect to the'mot'ie D,ijksma,.83 The second
step consists in the introduction of collective compensatory redress for
mass damages.
VI. The future of collective redress in the
Netherlands? The (preliminary) draft bill
mass damages claims 8a
1. A soiution for problems left open by
the WCAM amendment
The commission Recommendation encourages Member states to move
forward with class action legislation.ss A consultation has taken place
this summer regarding a draft proposal that amends Dutch law to al-
Iow representative actions for damages. It may look as if the Dutch
legislator foliows the European Recommendation. This drafb bill how-
ever results from the 'moti,e Dijksma' which preceded the European
recommendation and goes back to 20rr. The need for a compensatory
redress mechanism was widely felt in the Netherlands but so was the
s2lanika Tzankova, 'Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands,,
8--J.L. Econ. 
€! Pol'y (2012), p.577. See also: Ianika Tzankova, ,Resolving Mass
claim Disputes in Europe: Lessons from the Netherlands', IADC Neu.rLetter, Feb-
ruary 2013.
ll*:.tO,Mrs. Dijksma has urged the þovernment to amend the law in 2011.
'=Ih'" paragraph is largely based on the Explanatory memorandum that has
been accessible online since Ju.Iy T 2OI4: https://wr¡r¡,internetconsultatie.nll
motiedijksna.
85For now the commission has decided not to introduce iegislation on coilective
redress.
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concern about the negative consequences to which the existence of such
a mechanism might lead. Therefore, the drafb bill presented in this con-
sultation tries to strike a balance between a better access to justice in
a mass damages claim and the protection of the justified interests of
persons held liabie. It aims at enhancing the efficient and effective re-
dress of mass damages claims and at preventing meritless or unfounded
claims at the same time.
a) A 'stick,
First, this new bill provides the aggrieved parties with the desired ,stick'
to, if so needed obtain compensation by a court ruling. This new pro_
cedure can be used in cases where the parties are reticent (consumers)
or reluctant (businesses) to join a colÌective settlement or not able to
achieve a settlement. It introduces a threat of litigation to create an
incentive to settle.
b) A scope rule
second the draft bill aims at preventing procedures that are not suffi-
ciently connected to the l\etherlands. A new scope rule that purports to
avoid forum shopping will be introduced. The Dutch court is competent
if at least one of the following conditions is fulfilled:
a. those against whom the action is directed are domiciled in the
Netherlands;
b. the majority of the people for the protection of whose interests the
action is instigated, has its habituaÌ residence in the Netherlands;
c. the event or events to which the claim relates, have taken place
in the Netherlands.
This new scope rule is stricter. The requirement wilr not necessari-ly be met if the foundation or association representing the interested
persons is a Dutch entity as is now the case.
c) Even stricter standing requirements
Third, the draft proposal aims at further increasing the legitimac¡
transparency and accountability of representative organisations in or-
der to prevent a 'market for lemons' and to counter the risk of abusive
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litigation. when it comes to claiming damages, consumers must be cer-
tain that their interests are effectively being warranted by a represen-
tative organisation and professional parties must be protected against
frivolous claims by claims vehicles.
The standing requirements have again been tightened (sec-
tion V.1.a)). There is no separate representativeness-requirement (other
than in the WCAM application proceeding) but this requirement is em-
bodied in the second paragraph of art. 3:305a Cc. Art. 3:30ba(b) Cc con-
tains five new legal standing requirements partiy inspired by Rule 23
of the US federal rules of civil procedure (e.g. the fair and adequate
representation-rule (S) (a), the predominance- and superiority- (b) (3)86
and the numerosity-requirement (u)(1)ut, (b)(g)).8u
2. A five stage procedure
The draft proposal contains a flve-stage procedure for a corlective
damages action before the Dutch district court. The draft proposal
concentrates the know-how within one court. It is not clear yet which
court will be the competent court on collective damages claims. The
procedure is applicable to all kinds of claims, not only claims based on
consumer or competition law.
a) The first stage 
- 
the admissibility test
The first step entails an admissibitity test. Legai entities can start a
collective damages action on behalf of a group of persons as long as they
fulfill certain specific requirements (section vI.1.c)). The requirements
relate to the expertise regarding the claim, adequate representation and
the safeguarding of the interests of the persons on whose behalf the ac-
tion is brought. The legislator did not opt for designation or certification
of representative entities (cf. the commission Recommendation, nr. 6).
The group of persons on whose behatf the entity brings the action
must be of a size justifying the use of the collective damages action.It however is unclear which size would justify the use of a collective
86'the court fi'nd,s that, the quest'ions of raw or Jact common to class memberspred'orni,nate ouer any quest'ions o,ffecti,ng only i,nd,i,aid,ual members, and, that a cLass
actáon is super'ior to other aua'¿Iable metÌtod,s for Jairly and, effici,ently ad,jud,i.cati,ng
the controuersy'.
87'the class is so numerous that joi,nd,er of all members i,s i,mpracticable,.SSExplanatory Memorandum, p. 2O-2I.
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damages action. Another requirement is that those persons must nothave other efficient and effective means to get redress. presumabtl tneindividual enforcement of consumer rights wilr not readily be dåmed
efficient or effective. what is more, the representative entiiy must havetried to obtain redress from the person hetd riable amicabíy. A feriodof two weeks after the defendant has received a request fo. ,rr"i. 
"orr-sultations, indicating what is claimed, will not necessarily be deemed
sufficient to this end. The entity, however, is still not obliged to revearthe identity of the individuals on whose behalf it acts.
b) The second stage 
- 
a declaratory judgment
If the court is satisfied that ait the above-mentioned requirements havebeen met, the court wiil give its judgment on the tiauitity of the de-fendant. This judgment basicaily boils down to an art. 3:30ba cc-judgment (section III.1). A court wil more specificaily tackle thoselegal issues on which the parties disagree (this would have become cre-
ar during the amicable negotiations preceding the court actronj. Trelegal debate on damages and the coriective ,"ãr"r. thereof is onlf a[o-
wed if the court finds that the defendant can be held liable.
c) The third stage 
- 
the hearing of the parties at request of
one or both parties
Third there is a hearing of the parties in which the court tries to herpthem to reach a coilective settrement of the mass damages craim. A
settlement remains the goar of this procedure. If the pariies succeed,they may choose to ask the Amsterdam court of Appeat to declare this
settlement binding in reration to the entire group-of harmed persons.
-I]g-until this stage the procedure does not intrinsicaly differ from theWCAM-procedure.
During stage three, the court may seize the opportunity to discuss
and decide on the legar points which prevent the pàrties fråm reaching
a settlement and how to sorve those (in addition to his ruling in trr"
second stage). In fact parties will have to try to settie under the-court,s
auspices. The court may refer the parties to mediation if it thinks this
might help them to reach a coilective settrement of the mass damages
claim.
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d) The fourth stage 
- 
the submission
of a proposal by the parties
If at this stage no collective settlement has been reached, the court
may invite the parties to submit a proposal for a collective settlement
of the mass damages claim. Parties will however only be invited to do
so insofar as they are reaily committed. Each party may submit its
oì¡in proposal and each proposal must be based on damage-scheduling
and should, where possible, start from the consensus the parties have
reached at the previous stages of the procedure. The court may (once
again) refer the parties to mediation to discuss any divergen.", in ìh"i,
respective proposals in order for the parties to reach a collective sett-
lement.
e) The fifth stage 
- 
the establishment of a scheme for
collective redress by the court (an ultimum remedium)
If mediation fails or if the court has decided not to refer to media-
tion (because it does not deem this usefur) the court may establish a
scheme for collective redress of the mass damages claim. The court will
preferably base its scheme on the damage-scheduling proposals pro-
duced and submitted by the parties. An expert may be appointed to
advise on the damage-scheduling.
In order to warrant that the scheme to be established by the court is
an effective mechanism to solve the mass damages claim, tire court may
order the parties to ask the persons betonging to the group of peïsons
for whom the scheme is to be established, to submit a statement ofparticipation (opt-in) to the court before the scheme is established. If
the court finds that the number of participants is too small to justify
the establishment of a scheme, it may refrain from establishing åne. A
court will only in extreme cases decide on proposals from the pãrties to
collectively settle similar claims. No appeal can be lodged against the
scheme established by the court.
The scheme as established by the court cân be declared binding
upon a WCAM-application (leading to an opt_out mechanism). The
parties must inform the court of any collective settlement reachód and
of their intention to submit an application to the Amsterdam court
of Appeal under the wcAM. If the parties waive this possibitit¡ the
court will order the parties to announce the collective settlement in a
suitable way in order for victims to opt-in.
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3. Critical appraisal of the draft proposal
Does the drafb bill manage to address the complexity of collective com-
pensatory redress and the different interests involved? Not surprisingl¡
the Dutch Association of Listed Companies, the US Chamber Institu-
te for Legal Reform (iLR), the Confederation of Netherlands Industry
and Employers all reacted negativeiy to the draft bill. The majority of
respondents however gave a more nuanced view of the proposal. They
do not reject the idea of a coilective damages action but see much room
for improvement. Only a handful is largely positive. Most respondents
to the consultation have put forward constructive criticisms.se In the
next section I will elaborate on these critical remarks and assess wheth-
er the draft bill acknowledges the problems that were left open by the
2013 amendment of the WCAM. The source of the remarks will be
mentioned between brackets.
a) Enough is as good as a feast
Firstly the procedure is likely to have the opposite to the desired ef-
fect of preventing blackmail settlements and encouraging consumer
claims (cf. Council for the Judiciary). At the core of this criticism is the
length ofthe procedure that is considered opaque and labour-intensive.
Many respondents predict that the costs of the procedure will spiral
out of control.go
The procedure contains many duplications and redundancies.
Doubts have for example been cast on:
- the added value in the first stage of some of the new (sometimes
overlapping) standing requirements in view of the recent addition
of quality requirements by the amendment to the WCAM (cf.
Dutch Association for the Judiciary, section V.1.a)).el Standing
requirements are of paramount importance and their added vaiue
should be stressed but in view of the amount and vagueness of
the new requirements (cf. the Council for the Judiciary, the Dutch
Shareholders Association and the Foundation for the Settlement
of Collective Damages) this full quality assessment is expected
S9https 
: //nrr¡w. intexnetconsultatie. nL/¡rotiedì- jksna/reacties.goThese 
costs are soared by the choice for a 'petition'-procedure (cf. the Council
for the Judiciary).
9lExplanatory Memorandum, p. 20.
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to be laborious and unworkable. A more fundamental question
is whether it is for a court to assess the quality of representa-
tive organisations and the way they are financed.e2 A system of
designation/certification might be recommended.
- the added value of the court ruling in the second stage where
parties have already walked down the path of art. 3:30ba Cc (and
obtained a declaratory judgment, section 3.1)e3 and the added
value of the third stage addition to the ruling in the second stage
insofar as the court would still not be able to decide on contentious
individual issues such as the nature and extent of damage and
causation (cf. the Defence council).
- the added value of the fourth stage in view of the third stage (cf.
Consumentenbond and the Dutch Shareholders Association even
suggest stage 3 and 4 should be skipped if parties are unwilling to
cooperate). I do not think both stages should then be left aside
but I am definitely not convinced that a mediator is a solution
at this stage if its interference has not been meaningful before.
Mediation is moreover quite expensive and must never be an ob-
Iigation in view of art. 6 ECHR. Showing enough commitment
and time spent on mutual consultations are alreadv part of the
standing requirements.94 More in general: the court can exert a
Iot of pressure on the parties to force them to deliberate and
negotiate. The whole drafi bill is very typical of the Dutch pol-
der Modei 
- 
the Dutch version of consensus-based economic and
social policy making.
b) Opt-in and/or opt-out?
The proposal does not make a clear choice between an opt-in and an
or opt-out mechanism (cf. the Foundation for the settlement of col-
lective Damages). The opt-in mechanism does not fit in with the prin-
cipled preference for opt-in expressed in the commission Recommen-
g2Evaluating the admissibility of the financial set up of the action is a complicated
and time-consuming task.
93Explanatory Memorandum, p. 32.gaThe Dutch shareholders Association wisely advises to postpone this require-
ment to the start of stage 3: since the standing requirements for a ,simple, collectivedeclaratory redress procedure are less strict, claimants are likely to opt for thisprocedure to obtain a ruling of wrongfuiness.
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dation (nr. 21) as it concerns a rate opt-in (in the fifth stager). what
is more, a court has the choi,ce not to ask for an opt-in. If lt íooks ri-
ke parties will bring a wcAM-application, the couit might waive thispossibility (in order to avoid the accumulation of opting mechanisms).eb
Freeriding is thus very rikery to occur (even though the opt-in takesplace before the court takes its final decision) since there is no opt-in
at the start of the proceedings. potential claimants may await the out_
come of the proceedings before stepping in. The question however arises
as to how much information these potential claimants will receive when
being asked to opt-in: wiil they receive information about the proposed
schedules or about the scheme developed by the court (cf. the ôutch
Association for the Judiciary)? uncrear is whether this latà opt-in mech-
anism is even necessary in view of the numerosity-requirement in thefirst stage and the complexity and length of the proåedure (cf. DLA
Piper, cf. section VI.3.a)).
c) Compensation for trifle losses and low value damages?
It is doubtful whether the new procedure is suitable for the enforcement
of small and minor damages craims (section v.2.a)). The expranatory
memorandum stresses that this action is well adapted to those types of
claims.so This assumption is based on research conducted ¡n zobg.s,
The proposed procedure however appears to be very expensive dueto its length and complexity (section vl.3.a)). tne severÀt measuresthat aim at reducing the risk of frivorous ritigation reduce the pos-
sibilities for consumers to start an action. The complicated opt-in or
mechanism is for example to the detriment of consumers (and t""urrr"
of its timing not even effective to combat freeriding, cr. ionsurnenten-
bond, cf. section VI.3.b)).
The availability of funding arso remains a problem (sections v.l.c)
and v.2.a), cf. Bentham Europe timited and the Fouidation for the
settlement of collective Damages). The proposar does not indicate
how to (securely) enhance this type of financing. TpF is needed for
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esAnd legal aid is not directly available to special purpose foundations: IanikaTzankova, 'Funding of Mass Disputes: Lessons from the Netherlands',8 J.L. Econ.
€3 Pol'y (20t2), p.5Be-590.994. early opt-in would lower the risk of freeriding but consumers might notwant to invest in proceedings anyway since
to the amount at stake.
these costs might be disproportionate
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different reasons: consumers are either incapable of financing legal pro-
ceedings (the renovation of the subsidised legal assistance systeL does
not bode well for consumers)e8 or unwiling to do so (because the costs
outweigh the amount at stake; genuine freeriding is possible tooee). It
goes without saying that TPF should be subjected to criteria that war-
rant the claimants' interests and prevent abusive litigation at the same
time. criteria that protect defendants against abuses however often go
against the interests of the claimants.
The bill as it stands contains provisions (such as the obligation to
give the court insight in the financing structure of the representative
organisationl00) which tend to discourage TpF (cf. Barents krans). The
commercial interest in the outcome does in my opinion not constitute
a problem if it ensures that consumers have better access to justice.
As long as consumers receive a reasonabre proportion of the damages
they incurred, special interest gïoups should be allowed to commence
proceedings 'on a commercial basis,.101
At first sight, the risk of frivolous litigation is fairly smalt (cf. the
Dutch shareholders Association and Eumedion) as the óutch legal sys-
tem lacks the features that can iead to excesses such as blackmail sett-
lement and unmeritorious claims. Dutch law for example does not allowfor punitive damages, it only ailows penarty crauses to aid in enforce-
ment of the obligations of the agreement.102 The new procedure is di-
rected at a settiement based on damage-scheduring proposed by theparties: it will only be used where parties have seriousry tried tå butdid not succeed in reaching an agreement. And under óutch iaw, the
loser pays (although the award of costs to the winning party wil enableit to recover only a small percentage of its actual costs).
The ILR and the Confederation of Netherlands Industry and Em_ployers are nonetheress convinced that the risk of frivorous and abusivelitigation is very real. They argue in favour of essentiar .ur"g;urã, ,,_r"i,as those included in the Commission Recommendation (e.g. an earlyopt-in, designation and certification of representative organisations, re-striction of rpF). The regisrator must keep in mind thatî"y ,rärrr"rire
of the procedure rures wil hinder the accåssibility to tt 
" 
pro."îìr" ro,c.onsumers' If the iegisrator chooses to add safeguards uguìnriirirroto,r,litigation, he shourd opt for those safeguards that have tle reast impacton this accessibility.
d) checks 
"i:':;iiî.î #H."::iî. of the scheme
At first glance the proposar does not provide any guidance as to howthe court can estabrish a damage-schådule on iis ã*rr. If the parties
choose an opt-out sorution, the Ãmsterdam court of app"ui *iil t arreto 'approve' the settrement agreed under guidance of tir. lo-p"t"rrtcourt (section IV.B). According to the regislltor, the ¡udrciair"-,riu* ora court scheme w'r only be a marginar áne (instead of u i,ri ruirrru*
assessment).103 As I explained befoie (section IV.3.b)), the assessmentof settlement agreements already beaìs a marginar character.l,a Thisis- problematic given the fact that the coilective redress scheme esta-biished by the judiciary cannot be appealed: the marginur ur...r_""tconstitutes the onry review of the 
"o*t', decision. Mãreover the pro-posai does not state anything on the consequences of a rejection of awcAM-ap^plication (cf. the counc' for the Judiciary). wrr.,--o"r¿this mean for the legality of the scheme?
Another point of criticism bears upon the concentration of the dam_
ages claim procedures within on" 
"orrrt and the roie of this.o,rrfu, ¡o,tcase manager and final ruler.
100It is the responsibility ofthe court to evaruate the admissibility ofthe financial
set up of the action.
101In the Dutch state Lottery case it was agreed that, in case of success, theparticipants will receive 8070 0f the damagei, uná zo% *lr'¡e kepl bv tr,ã ãäu."uthat was the founder and director of the Foundation that starteà tnä p.o""J.,r".102The door has been opened to the use by lawyers of contingency fees in theNetherlands. The new law has however been ii*iteà to the individuaì reration be-tween a client and his lawyer and wiil for the time being not apply to the corectivedamages claim: Explanatory Memorandum, p. 1b.
103 Explanatory Memorandum, p. 25 and 47.The question was raised why the col-lective mass damages claim and the WCAM
-application were not combined withinone 
.iurisdictíon (cf. Dutch Association for the Judiciary104 Carla Klaassen, 'De rol van de (gewijzigde) WCAM bij de collectieve afwikke-ling van massaschade ,en nog wat van die dingen,, ,Ars ,4 equz (2013), g 4.I
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e) No forum shopping?
Lastly, the effectiveness of the scope rule (section V.1.b)) has been cal-
led into question. The first requirement (the defendant must be domi-
ciled in the Netherlands) remains quite broad.105 It looks iike the fact
that (a branch or subsidiary of) a company has a location in the Net-
herlands would suffice to grant jurisdiction to the Dutch courts. The
Dutch banking association and ILR suggest making the three require-
ments (the other two being that the majority of the claimants have their
ordinary residence in the |letherlands and that the event giving rise to
the claim occurred in the Netherlands) cumulative. The proposal should
also clarify how the scope rule fits in with IPL rules (cf. DLA Piper
and ILR).
VII. Conclusion 
- 
new developments in
litigation funding and a plea for public
Iaw solutions
The draft proposal pays insufficient attention to the problem of
the (third party) funding of collective redress (the court must decide
on the admissibility of TPF in a peculiar case, section VI.3.c)). The
draft statement of ELI on Collective Redress and Competition Dam-
ages Claim stresses the need to explore new fundi,ng techni,ques such as
crowdfunding.106 The Dutch exampie of Crowdsuing is quite interesting
in this respect.107 This particular initiative aims at enabling coilective
actions by raising money on behalf of the group that wants to start
proceedings against a multinational in order to change its behavior.
Crowdsuing is a moderating organisation (a so-called ,platform') that
brings the parties together to launch the idea. Individuals, organisa-
tions, lawyers can propose the case to be funded. At least 1000 people
need be affected. Individuals can support the initiative by funding it
without having any legal interest in the outcome. The platform pur-
ports to attract funding from people outside the circle of people who
are directly affected by the practice. The foundation crowdsuing will
105The Dutch shareholders Association on the other hand deems the scope rule
too strict.
1o6ELI, Draft Statement, p. g, 28.
1o7 http : / / t¡t¡w. rnr-online. nl/ juridisch-n íeu¡¡s / 24OT 3- crowdsuing-rechtszak
en-bekost igen- via- crowdf undÍng.
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then start the proceedings.l's Before starting raising the money, affiiia-
ted lawyers will evaluate the chances of success. If a case is abandoned
the donations will not be returned and wil be used for new proceedings.
Lawyers will be paid whatever the outcome of the pro.""dir.g, (as op-
posed to class actions).
For the time being the collective enforcement of consumer rights
still faiis when it comes to compensation of low-value damages (Iower
internet speed than advertised, a switch to minute-billing ty à 
-o-bile phone provider or expensive customer services phone tinesi.lOe the
draft bill on mass damages claims tries to strike the balance between
consumers' and traders' interests. It however proves impossible to re-
concile such diverging interests. preventing abusive litigátion is crucialbut strict rules might discourage the forming of interest groups and
the funding of typical consumer 
- 
low-value 
- 
damages actions. As it
stands, the new action will not facilitate the compensation of trifle los-
ses (in which the wcAM already proved unsuccessful). And even if the
procedure is simplified, it will still set high thresholds to the collective
enforcement of consumer rights in order to counter the threat of abu-
sive litigation. The gap left by failing private enforcement should i'my
opinion be filled by public enforcement. public compensation following
the Australian example should be a serious option. This option entails
that public (supervisory) entities can 'claim compensation, on behalf
of consumers.110 Another less far-reaching possibility would be to al-low 'collective follow-on actions'.1ll The 200g research on smaii and
scattered damage in the Netherlands has exprored these and otheril2
public alternatives to collective private compensatorv redress and came
l0Scrowdsuing.nl does however not intent to resolve claims by means other thanlitigation and is not prepared to negotiate and to accept mediation. This stan-
ce is completely out of line with the 1aw. Before starting a collective action, thelegal entity must have attempted to reach its goar by discussion out of court(art. 3:30¡a(2) Cc). The- new law even makes (a try at) mediatior, .o-prtr-y.
- 
'wsee for more exampres: willem van Boom, 'De ]\dinimis curat praetor 
- 
Råd."s,for-Dispersed Trifle Losses,, Journal of Comparatíue Lau,yol.4 (2009), p. iZ3.i1ocf. the Australian compensation orders for non-party consumers on applicationby,regulatory authorities: ACL pt b-2 Div 4 s. 2Zg-24I.111cf. the commission Recommendation, nr.33-34; trLI, Draft Statement, p. b0;
willem van Boom, 'De Minimis curat praetor 
- 
Redress for Dispersed T}ifle iosses,,Journal of Comparatáue Law,Yol.4 (2009), p.1g2-1g4.112such as duties to compensate damaga enforceable under pubric law or the
authority to demand the transfer of profits.
t
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to the conclusion that supervisory entities can effectively tackle small
damage.1l3 The draft bill did however not pick up on these findings.
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t!3 strooischade: Een aerkennend, (rechtsaergeli,jkend,) ond,erzoelc nøar d,e moget;i,jk-
hed'en tot optreden tegen stroo'ischade, p. 20 (fujt text only alailable in outcl):
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